Pompey’s senatorial allies quickly became disenchanted with the gruff Labienus. He lacked the dignitas requisite for recognition among the nobiles in the Republican camp, and so he probably had to be content with the rank of legatus.[39] But Pompey valued his presence and made him commander of the cavalry.[40] Labienus’ hand may be seen in the attempt to win at Pharsalus with cavalry.[41] It was not until after Pompey’s death, when the senatorial cause lacked a proven general, that he gained a scope befitting his skills as a tactician. Even then the nominal command fell to Q. Metellus Scipio, an unworthy scion of once illustrious families.[42]
After Pharsalus, Labienus escaped with his German and Gallic cavalry and brought the news of defeat to Dyrrachium. Cunningly, he tempered disaster with the encouraging deceit that Caesar received a mortal wound.[43] He then put his force under Cato’s orders at Corcyra and accompanied him, first to the Peloponnese and from there to Africa, intending to rejoin Pompey in Egypt.[44] Upon landing in Cyrenaica, however, they learned from Sextus Pompeius of his father Pompey’s death. Setting out toward Cyrene, Cato sent Labienus ahead with cavalry, but he was refused admittance into the town until Cato himself arrived a few days later.[45] When they heard that Scipio and Varus were raising an army with King Juba of Numidia, Cato marched across the desert and united his and Labienus’ forces with them.[46]
Labienus spent the next eighteen months building a strong cavalry around his sixteen hundred German and Gallic horse and eight thousand Numidian allies (BAf.19.3). Its superiority over legionaries for fighting in Africa gave him a greater importance than that of the imperator Scipio. But Cato probably appeased the popinjay’s pride while keeping Labienus in command.[47] It was a fortunate outcome, for Labienus’ tactics twice caused Caesar considerable anxiety (BAf. 71.2–72.1) and twice brought him to near defeat.