Caesar is vague about Labienus’ actions at the camp, though not necessarily by intention. The narrative derives its unity from the theme of Caesar’s personal intervention. Labienus held out against Vercassivellaunus and the picked Gauls until Caesar arrived with aid. This much is clear.
Labienus wintered at Vesontio with the seventh and fifteenth legions,[54] but in March of 51 b.c.e., the seventh was summoned for the campaign against the Bellovaci (BG 8.6.3). When they were subdued, and peace everywhere restored, Caesar called Labienus to is side and dispatched the fifteenth to Cisalpine Gaul (8.24.3). Labienus accompanied Caesar on a punitive expedition among the Eburones and then was sent with two legions to the Treveri (8.25.2). Later in the summer, he won a cavalry batle, killing many and taking their leaders captive (8.45.3). Hirtius does not say whether any of the three camps among the Aedui, Turoni and Lemnovices was under Labienus (BG 8.46.4). But in September, Caesar put him in charge of Cisalpine Gaul and from there he entered into negotiations with Caesar’s enemies (8.52.2–3).
The elements of power at Rome, as taught by Sulla and confirmed by Pompey, were three: vast wealth, the loyalty of veteran legions, a successful general who could obtain wealth and a personal army. In the years 58–51 b.c.e., Caesar became the man with whom the senatorial government had to reckon. He understood the workings of finance; money flowed in his camp and at Rome, the reward or inducement for services.[55] Instinctively, he was able to engender devotion among the centurions and common soldiers. But he gave little opportunity for others to do likewise. His legati, unlike Pompey’s in the 60s, were not sent home to stand for political office, the first step to military command.[57] For Labienus,6 possibly of praetorian rank since 60 or 59,[58] this could have been particularly embittering. He did not see Caesar as the future dictator, a prejudice which Mommsen in his appraisal of Labienus could not ignore.[58] He too was a victorious general. His subjugation of the Treveri, if suo imperio, would have won a triumph. The defeat of the Parisii resulted from the same bold initiative praised often in Caesar.[59] The commentaries testify to Caesar’s appreciation and respect for Labienus as a soldier. In other respects, they reveal a judgment of Labienus not as a partner but as a subordinate. Such was the condition of service in Gaul. Signs of strain appear in 51. Labienus was not employed against the dangerous Bellovaci. He spent the summer among the Treveri and away from Caesar. When the consulship seemed forthcoming, it was too late. Money and honors rarely bind a relationship after the balance of power has gone awry.